This paper uses matched data on the elderly and their children to study the provision of time by children to the elderly. It develops a Tobit model as well as a structural model to analyze the determinants of this decision. The main determinants of the amount of time given to parents appear to be the parent's age, reported health, and institutionalization status, and the children's age, health, and sex. Older parents, less healthy parents, and non-institutionalized parents receive more time from their children, while younger children, healthier children, and female children provide more time.
Has support of the aged by families declined in the post war period?
While the jury is still out, there is substantial evidence pointing in that direction. Over 60 percent of the elderly (those over 60) now live alone compared with only 25 percent in the 1940s. For the old old (those over 85) the fraction living alone has increased from 13 percent to 57 percent. At the same time there has been more than a tripling of the rate of institutionalization; today almost a quarter of the old old live in institutions compared with only 7 percent in the 1940s (Sandefur and Tuna, 1987) . In addition to not living with the elderly, the children of the elderly rarely provide financial transfers to the elderly (Kotlikoff and Morris, 1989 ) and when they do, the amounts are typically quite meager.
One defense of the children's behavior is demographic; the current number of children per elderly totals about half the number observed in the 1940s.
Since the elderly of today had fewer children than did their parents and have, in some cases, succeeded in outliving their children, the current Situation may be much of their own making. A second defense is that the relative income position of the elderly has improved permitting them to live alone (Michael, Fuchs, and Scott, 1980) and obviating the need for financial transfers from their children. A variety of studies (e.g., Boskin, Kotlikoff, and Knetter, 1985 and Andrews and Hurd, 1990 ) have demonstrated that current poverty rates of the elderly are close to, if not below, those of the nonelderly. Much of the improvement in the relative incomes of the elderly is due to increases in real social security benefits legislated in the l970s. A third point to consider in assessing child support of the elderly involves payment for nursing home care. A good fraction of the elderly in nursing homes are private pay patients. Some of these payments are being made directly by children. While we are not aware of time series data on nursing home payments by children, ic seems plausible that such payments per child measured at constant dollars have increased over time.
While the elderly may need and appear to be receiving less financial help from their children, their needs for compsnionship and physical assiatance may well have increased in the postwar period; the increased longevity of the elderly often means living for years in poor states of health. In addition, those elderly who continue to live will lose a large fraction of their old friends and even some of their children along the way. Most studies of the increasingly separate living arrangements of the elderly conclude that these arrangements reflect the preferences and improved financial means of the elderly. In contrast, Kotlikof and Morris (1988) suggest that about half of the elderly would prefer to live with their children, but continue to live apart because of their children's preferences coupled with their children's financial abilities to live apart from their parents.
One reason the jury remains out on family support of the aged involves the issue of time spent by children with their elderly parents. As Morgan's (1984) research suggests, children's provision of time to their elderly parents is an importsnt, if not the most important, form of economic transfer to the elderly by their children. This paper studies the provision of time by children to their elderly parents. We use the 1986 Hebrew Rehabilitation We take two empirical approaches in studying the data. First, we estimated Tobits for the provision of time by children. Second, we estimate a structural model of the joint decision of children to work and to provide time to their elderly parent. Since the opportunity cost of providing time to the parent for working children is the wage, the structural model indicates how wage rates influence the allocation of time by children to the elderly. The model can account for corner solutions in the data; this is important because some children do not work, some do not provide time to their parents, and some neither work nor provide time.
Our model assumes that the child is altruistic in that he (she) cares about the utility the parent receives from their time spent together. The model does not, however, consider the utility the child might derive from the consumption of the parent. Including the utility of parent's consumption in the child's utility function would require an analysis of financial transfers from children to parents. But given thst only 2.6 percent of children in our sample report making financial trsnsfers to their elderly parent(s), the extra complications of modeling financial transfers seems to outweigh the potential benefits.1 While we ignore financial transfers, the model does consider the simultaneous decisions by siblings as to how much time each sibling should provide the parent. The model assumes that each sibling takes time provided to the parent as given; i.e. , the siblings play non-cooperative Nash.
Another issue not considered by the model is the possibility that children are not altruistic, but, in effect, sell their time (a la Bernheim, Shleiffer, and Summers, 1985) to their parents. The quid pro quo for this sale of time is a financial payment by parents to their children. But such transfers are also quite rare in our sample. In our sample only .9 percent of children report receiving financial transfers from their parents. In addition, as described below, children receiving financial transfers from their parents are no more likely to provide time to their parents than those not receiving transfers. While the possibility remains that parents pay for time transfers by leaving larger future bequests, it is not clear how one would estimate the magnitude of such contingent payments.
Section I presents our simple structural model. Section II describes the data and our sample selecdon. Section III presents Tobit estimates of the allocation of time by children to their parents. Section IV presents maximum likelihood estimates of the structural model. Section V summarizes the paper's findings and provides suggestions for future research.
I. A Simple Structural Model of the Joint Labor Supply and Time Provision Decisions

A. The Model
Our model assumes that the child's utility is logarithmic and depends on his consumption, leisure, and the total amount of time the parent receives from himself (herself) and his (her) siblings. The utility function of sibling i, U, is given by (1) Ui -ologC + 8logi + log(d+ d,+ 1) jøi In (1) a, , and m are constants. The terms C, 1, d, and dj (jri) stand, respectivly, for consumption of child i, leisure of child i, time provided to the parent by child i, and tIme provided to the parent by sibling j. There are N siblings of child i. The unitary displacement value in the logarithm or time received by parent ensures the possibility that child i will provide zero time to his (her) parent even in the case that all his (her) siblings also provide zero time.
The child maximizes this function subject to constraints (2), (3), and (2) C W(l_I_d) + (3) diO (4) di+2.i Equation (2) says that consumption cannot exceed labor earnings plus exogenous income, Y. Equation (2) says that time provided to the parent cannot be negative, and equation (3) says that the sum of leisure time plus time spent with the parent cannot exceed the endowment of time which is normalized to unity.
Since (2) will always be binding, solutions for the values of and d satisfy: (6) and (7), we have the following four cases: 1) di+2il and d=0 surveys, the elderly sample was reinterviewed in 1984, 1985, 1987, and 1989 .
The 1986 NBER-HRCA Child Survey is a survey of the children of those elderly interviewed in the 1986 HRCA Survey of the Elderly. One child of each elderly respondent was interviewed and asked a set of questions concerning his (her) household, his (her) parents, and his (her) siblings.
The original 1982 stratified sample of 3856 elderly individuals was dra-n from two populations. The first population, accounting for 2674 of the elderly in the total sample, was drawn from communities in Massachusetts. In forming the community sample the state of Massachusetts was divided into 27 home care areas. Within each home care area communities were stratified, based on population, into large, medium, and small, and communities within each of the three groups were selected at random. Next HRCA used
Massachusetts police records, which record the ages and addresses of all Massachusetts residents, to stratify the elderly by age, separating those age 75 and above from those below age 75. Elderly individuals within each subgroup were then randomly selected. The coilununity and age stratifications produced an intentional over-representation of the old old as well as the elderly living in rural communities.
The second population, which accounts for the remaining 1182 elderly in the 1982 survey, was drawn from elderly participants of all 27 Massachusetts home health care corporations. In this sample the elderly were again stratified by age and the older old were oversampled. The sample's selection procedures are described in more detail in Morris et. al. (1987) . The 1982 sample of the elderly included only the non-institutionalized elderly, but each subsequent survey has followed the initial sample as they changed residences, including moving into and out of nursing homes.
Each of the HRCA Surveys of the Elderly include detailed questions about living arrangements and health status. The 1986 reinterview of the elderly also contains a series of questions of the elderly about their children.
These questions include the names, sexes, frequency of contact and the type of contact with children, the extent of financial aid given to and received from children, and the amount of assistance given by children to their elderly parents in performing activities of daily living. In addition, the 1986 survey contains a set of questions about the elderly respondent's income and wealth, At the close of the HRCA elderly survey the elderly respondent was asked for permission to contact one of his/her children and ask that child to participate in our child survey. While a random selection of the child respondents would have been preferable, it was felt that the elderly respondents would be more cooperative if they were allowed to make the selection. Because of funding limitations we were able to sample designated only children of the community sample of elderly; i.e. , we were not able to The basic sample used in our statistical analysis contains 1650 children of 706 elderly respondents. We excluded observations in the case that data is missing on a child's age, sex, occupation, health, education, marital status, grades received in school, and employment status. We also excluded children with missing information on time provided their parent, children less than 18 years of age, children whose co-residence status with the parent respondent was not reported, and children for whom we are missing data on their parent's age.
C. Data Characteristics
Of the 706 elderly parents. in our sample, 24 percent are age 55 to 70, 48 percent are age 71 to 80, and 28 percent are above 81 and above. Many of the elderly in our sample are in poor health; indeed 13 percent of the aample's elderly are in nuraing homes or similar inatitutions, and 15 percent are enrolled in home care programs. In total 40 percent of the elderly self-report their health as fair or poor (aa oppoaed to excellent or good). In terms of ADL (activities of daily living) status, the fraction reporting difficulty or inability in preparing their own meals is 44 percent;
it is 56 percent for the case of taking out garbage, 33 percent for the case of performing house chores, 22 percent for the case of dressing one's self, 24 percent for the case of taking a bath or shower, 10 percent for the case of getting out of a chair without assistance, 21 percent for the case of problems maintaining bladder control, and 28 percent for the case of walking up and down stairs without assistance.
Not all the children of the elderly are in excellent or good health. A total of 13 percent of the children report their health (or have their health reported) to be either fair or poor. In the case of the 1255 spouses of these children, 14 percent report (have reported) their health to be fair or poor.
In addition to time demands imposed by the elderly parent respondent, the children in our survey may need to respond to the time demands by their other parent and their parent in-laws. The fraction of children with two parents is 30 percent. In the case of in-laws information was obtained only for the child respondents; i.e. , the survey did not ask the child respondents about their siblings' in-laws. For child respondents the percent with one or two parent in-laws is 43 percent, and 33 percent of these in-laws are reported to be in fair or poor health. In the Tobit and mayimum likelihood estimation we use an imputed fulltime wage based on a regression of wages of child respondents or their spouses who report they are working full-time and for whom we can determine their wages plus salaries. As an example, in the case the respondent child is married, reports that he (she) works full-time, and also reports that his (her) spouse does not work, we know that the wages plus salaries of the couple are those of the child respondent. In this wage regression we use education dummies for years of education, grades in school, occupation, sex, health dummies, and a third order polynomial in age as explanatory variables.2 III. Model Estimation.
A. Tobit Estimates:
The Tobit model can be viewed as a test of a simpler version of the structural model presented above. It corresponds to the case that the amount of work the child does (which may be zero) is exogenously given, and the child simply divides his (her) non-work time between leisure and time spent with his (her) parent. In this simpler model consumption is exogeneously determined by the sum of exogenous non-labor plus labor income, so the child maximizes U -+ subject to diO, where stands for 1 minus the exogenously determined supply of labor. For this model equation (7) is modified to:
The provision of time is positive if the square bracket in (7' Our actual Tobit model is a slight modification of the standard Tobit specification to take account of the 29 percent of children in our sample whose parents live with them. In these cases it is obvious that the child spends time with the parent, but we are not sure how to assess the amount of time. To accommodate these data we treat these observations as observations The dummy for married parents (pml) was ommitted from the regression.
The coefficients on parent's marital Status indicate that as compared to married parents, divorced/separated parents (pm2) receive less time, but the standard error here is very large. In contrast, widowed parents' (pm3) receive substantially more time; and the coefficient is quite significant. The dummy for the child's sex (sx) was set to equal 1 for male children.
The coefficient suggests that male children who spend time, spend about 7 hours less per month than female children who spend time. The parent's sex dummy (psx), which also has a value of one for males, has a negative coefficient of -0.62 hours, but is not significant.
As expected, the dummy for, child's self-reported health being 'poor'
(h14) shows a large negative effect on time spent with parent, and the coefficient is significant. 'Poor' health of spouse (sph4) may be expected to curtail the amount of time spent by the child with the parent. However, the opposite result is obtained from the regression. The coefficient on sph4 is positive, but insignificant. The variable (ph4) is a dummy for parent's selfreported health status being 'poor'. As expected, the time provided by children is higher for parents whose health status is 'poor', but the coefficient is not significant.
The variable padl is a sum of 14 dummies, each having a value of one if the parent is unable to preform specific tasks, and a value of zero otherwise.3 A larger value of padi thus represents a higher degree of parent disability. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant.
Ita value is close to one, indicating that for every additional count of disability the child spends an additional hour per month with the parent.
The coefficient on the dummy indicating whether the parent is in a nursing home or similar institution (ply), is large, negative, and quite significant. The result suggests that such parents receive substantially less time from their children. A large, negative, and significant impact on child's time also arises in the case the parent receives services from a home care corporation (phc). Parents receiving 'Meals on Wheels' are represented as 1 in the next dummy variable (pwh). The coefficient is negative, but not significant. These results suggest that children substitute for their own time by using institutions, home care corporations, etc. to care fro their eldelry parents.
Older children spend less time with parents, but the coefficient on child's age (ag) is not significant. Older parents receive substantially more time, and the coefficient on parent's age (pag) is significant.
The next two dummies (milh4 and filh4) have a value of one if mother-inlaw's or father-in-law's health, as reported by the child is 'poor', for children who have either of these parents-in-law, Surprisingly, the coefficient on the former is highly positive and quite significant. Higher total income of the parent (pyv) when parent income is reported ia associated with aubstantially less time devoted by the child to the parent, but the coefficient is not significant. Higher total income of the child (kyv) is also associated with less time spent by the child with the parent, but again the coefficient is insignificant. The signs on both these coefficients are plausible: Parents with larger income can afford to buy supervisory and care services, and are, therefore, less dependent on their children, and children with higher incomes would be expected to have a higher opportunity cost of time.
If expectations of bequests are important determinants of parent-child relationships one would expect richer parents to receive more time from their children and richer children to provide less time to parents. The regression indicates that parents with higher net worth (pwlv) receive more time from children, and children with higher net worth (kwlv) spend less time with parents. The coefficients on both these variables are, however, insignificant.
Children with m higher wage rates (wage) spend somewhat less time with their parents. The coefficient on the wage rate is quite significant. Table 2 repeats the Tobit of Table I, Table 3 shows that children who are employed part-time (em2) spend less time with parents as compared to children employed full-time, though the coefficient is sgain not significant. Non-working children (em3) still spend less time with parents than those employed full-time, but the coefficient is now clearly significant.
The variable for number of siblings (ns) is significant and larger in absolute value in Table 3 as compared with Table 1 . The coefficient on the dummy for parents receiving home-care services is now a much smaller negative number and is insignificant. Table 3 shows a much smaller though still positive coefficient on the index for parent disability (padl), and the coefficient is now insignificant. This indicates that in the subsample of non-co-resident parents and children, children seem to spend very little additional time with parents when the degree of parent disability is higher. Table 4 repeats Table 3 , but also includes the total amount of time provided by siblings (sibtm) as a regressor. Surprisingly the coefficient on time spent by siblings enters with a positive sign though it is still not significant. The coefficient on the number of siblings variable (ns) in Table   4 is negative and significant. This seems to suggest that in the subsample under consideration siblings divide the total time spent with the parent amongst themselves. However, for any given family size, increased time spent by one child seems to induce additional time transfers from siblings. This interpretation must however be viewed with caution given that the coefficient on time spent by siblings is not significant.
B. Estimates for the Structural Model:
Tables 5 and 6 present maximum likelihood regression results for the structural model presented in Section I. The data used for this estimation is a subsample of 415 respondent children who do not live with their parent, and for whom valid data on labor and non-labor income are available.4 Table 5 presents estimated values for the coefficient vectors 9 and contained in the regression equations used to model the parameters of the utility function (1) Using the estimated values and 3 and a given configuration of the vector x we can obtain the individual-specific preference parameters a and fi. The optimal choices of the time transfer to parent (d) and the amount of leisure (i) can then be inferred by setting the terms within the square brackets of (6) and (7) to equal zero and simultaneously solving the two resultant equations. If the optimal choice of d turns out to be negative, a corner solution is imposed by setting d to zero and recomputing the optimum amount of leisure.
The first row of Table 6 presents The results in Table 6 indicate that out of a total of 4380 hours per year a hypothetical individual with mean characteristics spends 50 hours per year with the parent, conaumes 3368 hours of leisure per year, and works for the remaining 962 hours.
Divorced/separated children (mr2) and widowed children (mr3) spend more time with their parents than do married children (the dummy for which (mrl) was excluded). A corner solution on time spent with the parent is obtained when the value of the dummy for never-married children (mr4) is set at unity.
All non-married children consume less leisure than married children. These results confirm those of Table 4 (which is also based on a sample of non-coresident parents and children): Widowed children spend the most, and nevermarried children the least, amounts of time with their parents.
A corner solution is also obtained when the parent's marital status is separated/divorced (pm2) rather than married (the dummy for which (pml) was excluded). Compared with children whose parents are married, children with a widowed parent (pm3) spend more time with the parent and also consume slightly less leisure.
Children whose spouses work full-time or part-time (sempl) spend more time with parenta and consume a slightly lower amount of leisure. This is also consistent with the results of Table 4 .
The larger the number of siblings (ns), the greater the amount of time spent by the child with parent and the lower the amount of leisure consumed.
This effect is surprisingly large. The Tobit specification showed that a larger number of siblings reduces the time spent by the child with the parent.
Unlike the Tobit model, however, the leisure decision is endogenous in the structural model. A possible explanation of this result is that with fixed time spent by siblings, a larger number of siblings implies smaller lengths of visits to parent by each sibling. To compensate the child reduces his consumption of leisure and increases the time spent with parent.
Changing the value of the child's sex dummy (sx) to 1 results in a sharp decline in the amount of time spent with the parent and the amount of leisure consumed decreases by 384 hoursper year. A similar, though much smaller, reduction is obtained in both time spent and consumption of leisure when the parent's sex dummy is set to unity.
Corner solutions are obtained for both the endogenous variables when child's health (hl4) or child's spouse's health (sph4) dummies are alternatively set to unity. A substantially larger amount of time transfer is induced when the parent has 'poor' health (ph4). Children with parents residing in a nursing home or similar institution (ply) spend less time with the parent and consume substantially more leisure. There is a substantial decline in time spent by children when the parent receives home care services (phc), although the increase in the child's consumption of leisure is slight.
These results are consistent with those of Table 4 . Contrary to the results of Table 4 , the child seems to spend much more time when the parent is receiving 'Meals-on-Wheels' (pwh).
Surprisingly, and in contradiction to earlier results, Table 6 shows that the time spent by children declines, and the amount of leisure consumed increases, with increasing degree of disability (padi) of the parent. Another surprising and puzzling result is that children with a mother or father-in-law with poor health make large time transfers to the parent.
The results obtained by perturbing values of child and parent ages, child's non-labor income, child's wage rate, parent's income, and child and parent wealth variables are all consistent with those of Table 4 . The negative effect of time spent by siblings on the time spent by the child is not consistent with the result in Table 4 . However, it is the "built in" prediction of the structural specification which assumes that siblings play non-cooperative Nash.
IV. Conclusion
The Other things equal, those elderly who self-report their health to be 'poor' appear to receive over twice the amount of time received by elderly with better self-reports of health. Surprisingly, the degree of elderly disability does not appear to affect the amount of time provided to those elderly not living with their children, although it is a significant determinant in the larger sample that includes elderly living with their children.
The Tobit results for the entire sample of children, including those living with their elderly parents, indicate that more time is provided by single children and more time is received by single elderly, at least those who are widowed. In the structural model the effects of the child's and parent's marital status on time provided to the elderly are less clear, but there is strong evidence that widowed children spend substantially more time with their elderly parents.
The structural model predicts that more time provided by siblings will lead to substantially less time provided by the child in question. However, this prediction is, to a large extent, simply the implication of the form of the structural model we have adopted. In the less constrained Tobit estimation there is no evidence that siblings free-ride on each others' provision of time.
Both the Tobit and the structural estimates indicate a small effect associated with higher children's wage rates; children with higher wage rates provide somewhat less time to their elderly parents than other children. In contrast to the modest effect of higher wage rates, the effect of larger values of children's wealth is quite sizable. Wealthier children and children with higher incomes appear to provide less time than poorer children, but the standard errors around these effects are quite large.
The standard errors on the effects of parent's wealth and income are also sizable. One might summarize the findings here by saying that there is -26certainly no strong evidence thst richer psrents receive more time than poorer parents; i.e. , the paper provides little, if any, support for the Bernheim, Schleiffer, and Summers (1986) view that richer parents, in effect, purchaae more time from their children.
To summarize, the results indicate that the main determinants of the amount of time given to parents are demographic. Economic variables, such as wage rate and income levels, appear to play a rather insignificant role in the provision of time.
Key to variables used in Tobit rearessions. a) The variables knly, sibtm, and wage are part of the structural specification and have therefore been omitted from x, the vector of characteristics. b) Work-time is endogenous and therefore cml and em2 have been omitted from vector x. c) This subsample has no observation with parent making a financial transfer to the child. Hence the variable phlpl was omitted from vector x. d) Asymptotic Standard Errors (S.E.) and t-Statistics are tabulated. 
